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Vaughn: New Facets of Old Alternatives for Unleased Mineral Interests

NEW FACETS OF OLD ALTERNATIVES FOR
UNLEASED MINERAL INTERESTS,
By Lisa Vaughn
This article explores why pooling is especially needed in urban areas
such as the Barnett Shale, and what operators and mineral interest
owners can do to solve the problems caused by unleased and unpooled property interests.
The obvious starting place for our analysis is that an operator
desires to minimize expenses for obtaining and developing the minerals he seeks to extract, and a mineral owner desires to obtain and
maximize the value for his share of the minerals. In places other than
the Barnett Shale, it can be easy: the landowner (who most likely
owns both the minerals and the surface) and the operator enter into a
lease for a big chunk of land; the operator drills a well on it, and the
owner gets paid his share of the royalties.
In the Barnett Shale, however, the complications caused by the
Railroad Commission's (RRC) spacing and allocation rules, municipality-dictated restrictions on drilling, severance of minerals, horizontal drilling techniques, and the tiny tracts of land typical in urban areas
all combine to play havoc with what started out as a simple drill-andpay scheme.
Because many homeowner tracts are only 1/3 acre or less, producers
can be required to secure hundreds of leases for a single well. Securing those leases can be a costly proposition, both for the costs of the
leases themselves and the transaction costs associated with negotiating
and then keeping track of all those separate leases. And that is if
things go smoothly. What if hold-outs in a neighborhood refuse to
lease? What if the geographical features or building structures already present in the area require that the drill site be placed near the
edge of a tract, which would drain minerals from non-leased land?
What if geographical or other issues dictate that the well be sited on a
1. Sources, ideas and perspectives for this article were inspired by not only the
cases and authorities cited, but by many excellent seminars and articles, some of
which are referenced below. There were certainly others over the years, and for those
I forgot to include, I offer apologies.
* H. Philip Whitworth, Horizontal Drilling in Urban Areas and Particularly the
Barnett Shale, 25th Annual Advanced Oil, Gas & Energy Resources Law Course
(Oct. 4-5, 2007).
" Carroll Martin & D. Davin McGinnis, All for One and One for All A Primeron
Pooling in Texas, 31st Annual Ernest E. Smith Oil, Gas and Mineral Law Institute
(April 1, 2005).
" Bruce M. Kramer, The Nuts and Bolts of Pooling: A Primerfor the Uninitiated,24th
Annual Advanced Oil, Gas & Energy Resources Law Course (Oct. 5-6, 2006).
" JOSEPH SHADE, PRIMER ON THE TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS (4th ed. 2008).
" Mark K. Leaverton, MIPA ... Schmipa: The Foibles of Texas Forced Pooling, 25th
Annual Advanced Oil, Gas & Energy Resources Law Course (Oct. 4-5, 2007).
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separate parcel altogether, with horizontal drilling traversing unleased
land? For all of these complications, an old, little-used statute called
the Mineral
Interests Pooling Act-MIPA-may be the "new"
2
answer.
I.

POOLING GENERALLY: WHY, HOW, WHEN, AND UNDER
WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES?

At its simplest, pooling is nothing more than grouping together
small tracts of land to form a drilling and production unit for a well.
In the Barnett Shale, where there are no between-well spacing requirements, pooling allows enough land to be gathered to meet leaseline spacing requirements and increase production allowables if they
are established by the RRC for this field.
In Texas, pooling has typically been created by an agreement between the parties who own separate tracts. Those agreements take
several forms. One way for separate tract owners to pool their interests is by execution of a community lease, although this method is
becoming more and more rare. In Texas, the execution of a community lease constitutes a pooling of the respective individual interests
committed to the community lease so that production from anywhere
in the community will be apportioned among all of the community
lessors.3 Another way to accomplish pooling is for the mineral owners
to execute pooling agreements that are separate from the leasing
agreements. This is also becoming more rare, since the vast majority
of pooling agreements are now incorporated into the leases
themselves.
When there is no agreement between the parties, however, pooling
can still occur under MIPA.4 In Texas, forced pooling under MIPA
has been a rare procedure by both sides of the energy equation, but
current developments may and should increase its importance, particularly in the Barnett Shale and other urban areas.

II.

ECONOMICALLY COMPELLING REASONS FOR POOLING

For operators, pooling allows them to extend the life of multiple
leases with production from a single well. In urban areas such as the
Barnett Shale, pooling is almost mandatory due to the multiplicity of
small tracts of land, which are generally too small or oddly shaped to
support a well because of rules such as those requiring placement at
least a certain distance from any lease lines. And of course, pooling
can allow a horizontal well's bore site to be placed far from where the
reservoir will actually be tapped, thus allowing operators to comply

with municipal regulations and public policy issues by placing drilling
2. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 102.001-112 (Vernon 2001).
3. See, e.g., Long v. Knox, 291 S.W.2d 292, 298 (Tex. 1956).
4. See § 102.012.
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activities further from homes. It also allows more production from
fewer wells, thus serving the goals of conservation and minimizing
waste. Beyond these reasons, however, are some lesser-known issues
that can best be solved by pooling.
A.

Lessee may have a duty to pool.

Texas operates under the "rule of capture," which means that as
long as the well has been properly permitted by the RRC, all minerals
produced by that well "belong" to the well site property, no matter
from where those minerals migrated prior to being extracted by the
well.5 The rule of capture generally protects an operator from being
liable for draining neighboring lands in which he holds no interest.
As a result, older Texas cases indicate there is no duty to pool.6
However, newer cases impose the duty to act as a reasonably prudent
operator, and that may include pooling, especially if pooling would
prevent drainage.7 Thus, when lands in which the lessee has an interest are being drained, the lessee may be required to exercise pooling
authority or seek it where it is not already given when a profitable
well cannot be drilled to protect the non-drillsite tract. For example,
in Tide Water Associated Oil Company v. Stott,' the court found in a
gas-cycling project that the operator fulfilled its implied covenant to
prevent drainage by offering to pool.9 Notably, other jurisdictions facing this question have imposed this obligation.' ° Thus, an operator
may be able to use pooling, and perhaps even an offer to pool regardless of whether the offer is accepted, to protect itself from a suit for
breach of the implied covenant to prevent drainage.
B.

Lessee may expose itself to additional expenses or lawsuits if all
interests touched by the well bore are not pooled.

1. Absence of pooling requires an RRC hearing to get a drilling
permit. To obtain a drilling permit for pooled lands, RRC Rule 40
requires that the operator file a Certificate of Pooling Authority,
which must identify each tract pooled and whether any of the tracts
have any unleased interests."a The operator is then required to pro5. See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 13
(Tex. 2008).
6. See, e.g., Waters v. Bruner, 355 S.W.2d 230, 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
7. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex. 1981) (stating
that duties of reasonably prudent operator may include seeking voluntary unitization); see also Se. Pipe Line Co. v. Tichacek, 997 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. 1999) (noting
that pooling is an acceptable and common protective measure to prevent drainage).
8. Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. Stott, 159 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1946).
9. See id.
10. See, e.g., Breaux v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 2d 406, 415-16 (La. Ct.
App. 1964); Gilham v. Jenkins, 244 P.2d 291, 294 (Okla. 1952).
11. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.40 (2009).
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vide notice to those unleased interests, and the owners are given an
opportunity to protest at a RRC hearing; this mechanism is intended
to help prevent a small-interest lessee or mineral-interest owner from
being left out, but there are no absolutes. Similarly, if a proposed drill
path would violate the lease spacing requirements, the operator is required to give notice to the owners and provide those landowners the
opportunity to protest.'" At these hearings, the only grounds sufficient to defeat a permit are that denial is necessary to prevent waste
and to protect correlative rights of those property owners whose interests are actually crossed. Notably, the RRC has refused to deny permits based on complaints that the correlative rights of nearby mineral
owners would be negatively impacted by drainage.' 3 However, if all
interests were pooled, objections and the expense of hearings could be
avoided.
2. Drillpipe placement may result in illegal wells. The Rule 37
requirement of a certain number of feet between the well and the
nearest property or pooling line can be tricky with horizontal drilling.14 For horizontal wells in the Newark (East) Field, the distance to
the "lease line" for Rule 37 purposes is measured by the distance from
the lease or pooled unit's boundary line to the nearest perforation in
the well, as long as the well is cased and cemented back above the top
of the correlative interval that is, the top of the producing formation.
Similarly, if an external casing packer is placed in the well and cement
is pumped above this packer to a depth above the correlative interval,
the spacing distance is measured from the top of the casing packer or
the closest open hole section in the interval to the nearest lease or
pooled unit line. In the meantime, however, before the well is completed and the packers and cement are placed it would appear that the
well would violate the spacing rules, which might render the well
"non-permitted."
Yet another lack-of-permit scenario may arise if the drillpipe ends
up in locations not originally planned. Chesapeake recently encountered this issue when the horizontal portion of a well it was drilling in
Fort Worth extended nearly twice as long as the initial permit allowed,
leaving fifteen unleased and unpooled lots closer than the required
distance of 330 feet from the well bore. As a result, Chesapeake may
have to shut down the well altogether. 5 Again, these negative consequences could be avoided if all the interests are pooled.
12. 16

TEX. ADMIN. CODE

§ 3.37 (2009).

13. See Tex. R.R. Comm'n, Application of Andarko E & P Co. LP for an Exception to Statewide Rule 37, Docket No. 0246122 (Dist. 3 Apr. 19, 2006) (proposal for
decision) (acknowledging drainage problem faced by nearby small landowners, but
refusing to permit that drainage to justify denying Rule 37 exception).
14. See § 3.37.
15. See Jim Fuquay, Chesapeake, City, Homeowners, Spar Over Well Drilled Beneath Unleased Property, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Feb. 24, 2009, http://
www.star-telegram.com/business/story/1224441.html.
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3. Unpooled severed surfaces can result in trespass. Yet another
potential problem from lack of pooling arises if the well site is located
on a surface that is severed from the mineral interests or the mineral
interests below that surface are not being developed. Normally, the
surface estate can be used to develop the minerals under that surface
because the surface estate is considered subservient to its mineral
estate.'6
However, there is authority that if the minerals were severed prior
to pooling, the surface owner may be able to enjoin or seek damages
from development efforts that include minerals from other tracts. 7
This is even more certain if the unpooled surface is being used to site a
horizontal drill that produces only from other tracts, in which case the
operator will be subject to lawsuits seeking to enjoin operations or
trespass damages. 8 Thus, if the surface is severed, the pooling of the
mineral estate by itself will not necessarily expand the rights of the
operator to use the surface to assist the pool. A separate surface lease
or proper pooling that includes the surface can avoid these negative
results.
4. Drillpipe crossing unpooled subsurfaces can result in trespass.
A Rule 37 exception does not excuse or forgive trespass. 19 As a result, if the drillpipe actually traverses a piece of unpooled property,
the operator may be liable for an expensive trespass or find itself defending against an injunction to stop drilling. There is at least some
authority that mineral owners whose lands are not being produced,
but whose property is crossed by horizontal well bores, may enjoin the
trespass or seek damages regardless of whether the pipe is in the correlative zone.20
If the well bore traverses the correlative zone, the courts have held
that damages can be 100% of all production unless the operator can
prove to a reasonable certainty the proportion of production attributable to each unpooled tract, which can be a difficult and expensive
16. See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971); Ball v. Dil-

lard, 602 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. 1980) (holding that a surface owner may not unreasonably interfere with the mineral estate).
17. See, e.g., Property Owners of Leisure Land, Inc. v. Woolf & Magee, Inc., 786
S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no writ) (stating that the surface may not be
used to develop minerals from other tracts unless those mineral interests are pooled).
18. See Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tex. 1973)
(holding that the severed surface of one tract may not be used for oil and gas operations on adjacent tracts without the surface owner's permission).
19. See Berkley v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 282 S.W.3d 240, 243 (Tex. App.Amarillo 2009, no pet.).
20. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Howell, 407 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (upholding an injunction against drilling operations because of
the "inevitable" damage to the subsurface formation whenever a well is drilled). But
see Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. L. & G. Oil Co., 259 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that the mineral owner could not enjoin the
drilling unless it could show that the drilling would interfere with its rights to develop
minerals).
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burden of proof."1 For a potentially contrary view, see Browning Oil
Company v. Luecke.22 In the Lueke case, the court limited the lessor's
recovery to only that production which was attributable to the portion
of the horizontal drainhole actually under the lessor's acreage. Notably, however, the cause of action in Luecke was based on breach of a
lease's pooling provision, not on trespass; as a result, the lessees had a
lease governing production of the plaintiff's minerals, which no doubt
significantly affected the damage calculation and should make this
case inapplicable to apply to trespass cases.
If the 100%-of-production rule is found to apply to horizontal trespasses or the operator cannot prove what percentage of production
comes from the trespassed tract, damages can be large. Damages become even higher if the well violates its RRC permit, because such a
trespass is very likely to be found in "bad faith." Whether the trespassing operator can deduct drilling and operating costs is determined
by whether the trespass was in good faith; that is, the operator had a
reasonable but incorrect belief that his title permitted him to be on
that land.23 In short, there is a substantial risk that unpooled interests
along the path of a horizontal drainhole will have to be paid as if it
were a drill site.24 Once again, valid pooling agreements will negate
the potential for trespass actions.
C. Lessee can use pooling to increase allowable production and
minimize need for Rule 37 exceptions.
As if avoiding trespass damage and potential injunctions were not
enough incentive to pool, the proration or the amount of production
permitted by the well is affected by the unpooled portions of the horizontal drainhole. Under Rule 86, all of the horizontal drainhole
within the correlative interval must be included in the proration unit
or no allowable will be granted.2
Horizontal drainholes must comply with applicable Rule 37 spacing
exceptions as to each and every point of the well in the correlative
interval between the penetration point (where the horizontal string
begins) and the terminus (where the horizontal string ends), which
means that all of those points must be a minimum of 330 feet from the
lease or pooling boundary. Obviously, then, the larger the pool, the
less likely the minimum distance requirements will be violated.
21. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1974).
22. See Browning Oil Co. v. Luecke, 38 S.W.3d 625, 640-41 (Tex. App.-Austin
2000, pet. denied).
23. See, e.g., Bender v. Brooks, 103 Tex. 329, 336, 127 S.W. 168, 171 (1910).
24. Am. Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 449 S.W.2d 794, 798
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
25. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.86 (2009).
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Small or adjacent lessors' only mechanism to obtain value for
drainage may be pooling.

Probably most lawyers in Tarrant County have been approached by
a left-out landowner with drilling going on somewhere nearby, asking
whether they have any rights. If the drilling is only "nearby" and does
not actually touch their property, these landowners have limited options because of Texas' use of the rule of capture, even though everyone acknowledges that the drilling is draining mineral interests from
which they would have been able to profit otherwise. Unfortunately,
even objecting to an operator's request for a Rule 37 exception does
not provide these owners relief, because the RRC has denied such
objections.2 6 These owners' only recourse has historically been to
seek for voluntary pooling with the producing tracts.
To sum up, there are powerful financial reasons encouraging pooling. But what if the operator and mineral owner cannot agree?
III.

MINERAL INTERESTS POOLING AcT, OR

MIPA

FOR SHORT

MIPA was originally codified as Texas Revised Statutes Annotated,
art. 6008c (1965) but was subsequently recodified into Chapter 102 of
the Natural Resources Code.2 7 MIPA was a legislative response to the
Texas Supreme Court's decision in Atlantic Refining Company v. Railroad Commission of Texas 28 (known as the Normanna case because
the proration issues being litigated arose from production in the
Normanna Field). In the Normanna case, the Texas Supreme Court
struck down proration formulas that favored small tracts and allowed
significant drainage of adjoining larger tracts in favor of formulas
based largely on acreage. This decision made it uneconomical to drill
wells on smaller tracts and created the political environment that led
to the passage of MIPA.
Unlike other states' forced-pooling statutes, MIPA is generally regarded as an act meant to encourage voluntary pooling rather than an
act to provide compulsory state action. 29 According to legislative history, the real purpose of MIPA comes into play when pooling would
be desirable to protect correlative rights and prevent waste, but the
parties cannot work out a deal for themselves. In other words, MIPA
26. See Tex. R.R. Comm'n, Application of Andarko E & P Co. LP for an Excep-

tion to Statewide Rule 37, Docket No. 0246122 (Dist. 3 Apr. 19, 2006) (proposal for
decision) (acknowledging drainage problem faced by nearby small landowners, but
refusing to permit that drainage to justify denying Rule 37 exception).
27. Act of 1965, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 11, p. 24, Tex. Civ. Stat. Art. 3008c (recodified
by the Mineral Interest Pooling Act, TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 102.001-.112
(Vernon 2001)).
28. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pend Oreille Oil & Gas Co., Inc., 817 S.W.2d 36,
49-50 (Tex. 1991) (citing Atl. Ref. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 162 Tex. 274, 346
S.W.2d 801 (1961)).
29. See Ernest E. Smith, The Texas Compulsory Pooling Act, 43 TEX. L. REV.

1003, 1009 (1965).
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is a fall-back position meant to be used only after voluntary efforts
have failed.3" Regardless of its "voluntary encouragement goals,"
however, MIPA can be used to force absent or unwilling parties to
pool in the right circumstances.
Most articles that discuss MIPA note that it has not been used
much, and although actual counts vary depending on the source, it
cannot be disputed that MIPA is a little-used tool.3 1 Although MIPA
was in theory originally designed to protect the small-tract owner, in
practice it has been an inefficient vehicle for that protection because
of the relative cost. However, we may now discover that MIPA can
morph into a powerful mechanism for operators, especially in urban
areas such as the Barnett Shale where operators are facing checkerboard holdings due to the confluence of several circumstances including the sheer number of lots that must be leased to form a production
unit and several years of intense leasing activities that increased mineral owners' monetary demands and led to aggressive hold-out negotiations. This was compounded when the recent sinking market for gas
prices caused widespread abandonment of leasing activities.
In this context, some 40 years after MIPA was enacted, MIPA almost seems tailor-made for the Shale. For example, MIPA does not
apply to fields where the reservoir was discovered before March 8,
1961.32 Since Newark (East) was discovered in 1981, however, the
Barnett qualifies. Similarly, MIPA only applies if the RRC has
adopted special field rules for the reservoir at issue (it has); all tracts
sought to be pooled must be in the same reservoir (they almost certainly are); and all acreage sought to be pooled must be within the
productive limits of the reservoir. All of these requirements are especially 3likely to be true for all Barnett Shale properties in the urban
area.

3

About the only aspect of MIPA that does not permit maximization
of value in the urban horizontal drilling context is MIPA's limitations
on the size of proration units, which were established before the days
of horizontal drilling. Under MIPA, the RRC can create a pool for a
gas well of 640 acres plus 10% for a gas well, and the force-pooled unit
must contain that approximate acreage. 34 However, if the pooling is
30. See generally 56 TEX. JUR. 3d Oil and Gas § 576 (2004) (stating that the Texas
Railroad Commission may prescribe forced pooling in certain situations); Am. Operating Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 744 S.W.2d 149, 154 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987, writ denied) (explaining that MIPA is intended to provide parties with
encouragement and an incentive to voluntarily pool).
31. See COLIN K. LINEBERRY, THE TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION'S ROLE IN THE
OIL AND GAS BUSINESS INCLUDING POOLING AND DISPOSAL WELLS 3 (2008) (stating
that "in the last 10 years, of the 41 MIPA applications filed at the Commission, 14
were dismissed, 23 were withdrawn, and three were granted by Commission final
order.").
32. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.003 (Vernon 2001).
33. See §§ 102.011, 102.018.
34. Id. § 102.011.
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voluntary, the RRC will permit horizontal gas wells in the Barnett to
be considerably larger than 700 acres if the well is drilled minimum
distances.3 5
Who can apply for forced pooling? As we have discussed, MIPA
was originally enacted to create an avenue for the left-out small-tract
owner to obtain value for the owner's minerals. Standing to bring a
MIPA is not limited to owners of mineral estates, however, and there
is no limitation on the size of the ownership for a MIPA applicant.
However, there is an argument that there are some limitations on
the types of owners that can apply for forced pooling. As printed, the
current statute appears to permit the owner of any interest at all to
apply for forced pooling, as long as one is not trying to force pool
government lands.3 6
In contrast, the original codification made distinctions on who could
apply to force pool based on whether the unit to be created was "existing" or "proposed." An "existing" unit is one that geographically
encompasses the applicant's property interest but in which the applicant's interest has not been pooled. A "proposed" unit occurs when
the applicant seeks to pool a tract of land that is being or will be
drained by an adjacent unit and its addition to the unit will change its
geographic boundaries. As originally codified, the punctuation and
structure of the language made it clear that if the applicant is attempting to join an "existing unit," an owner of any interest in that unit can
apply for pooling, but if the unit is "proposed," only working interest
owners and unleased owners could apply.
The recodifiction into the Natural Resources Code, however, did
not maintain the prior structure of the statute even though the act that
created the Natural Resources Code and recodified the old statutes
stated that "it is the intent of the legislature that each provision of this
code be interpreted to have the same meaning as the statutes from
which it is derived."3 7 In the original, the first part addressed existing
units, and subparts a and b modified the portion relating to proposed
units. Conversely, the recodified (current) statute combined parts 1
and 2 into a single point and made subparts a and b each their own
independent grounds. As a result, if the section as currently written is
read literally without knowledge of the prior structure, parts 2 and 3
are superfluous and contradictory to part 1, which grants standing to
any interest owner regardless of whether the unit is existing or proposed. This conflict between the original codification and the current
35. 16 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.86 (2009); Tex. R.R. Comm'n, Final OrderAmending the Field Rules, Docket No. 09-0253880 (July 29, 2008).
36. §§ 102.004, 102.012 (requiring lands to be pooled must be privately owned unless General Land office or other applicable agency consents).
37. Act of May 4, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S. ch. 871, Art. II, § 113.097, sec. 15, 1997 Tex.
Gen. Laws 2692, 2697.
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has not been decided, but in any event, will not preclude an operator
from applying.
What types of lands can be forced into the pool? In addition to the
potential limitations on the types of owners that can seek forced pooling, MIPA contains several limitations on the types of lands that can
be pooled. First, the lands being pooled must be privately owned unless the General Land Office or the applicable state agency consents.38
Second, § 102.014(a), also known as the "muscle-in provision," generally disallows forced pooling of lands that, on their own, have sufficient acreage to be as large as the standard proration unit for the
reservoir.39 Even in that situation, though, the RRC still has authority
to force pool that large tract on behalf of an adjoining mineral interest
owner whose lands are less than the standard proration unit if the
owner has not been offered a reasonable opportunity to pool
voluntarily. n
Third, the existing or proposed unit must have separately owned
interests in two or more tracts. 41 Fourth, only those units where a well
is already drilled or is proposed to be drilled are subject to forced
pooling.4 This latter requirement gives an operator additional control over the forced pooling options, because only an operator, not a
royalty owner, has the right to drill.
In short, although MIPA was intended to assist the small left-out
mineral interest owners, an operator is fully authorized and perhaps in
the best position to use MIPA to join or expand a pool.
When can an applicantseek forced pooling? Perhaps the most significant restriction of MIPA is that forced pooling can be granted only
if the applicant has attempted voluntary pooling and failed. This requirement is more than procedural: it is jurisdictional. As a result, the
applicant must prove much more than it made a simple attempt at
voluntary pooling. Indeed, before the RRC can act on the application, the RRC must make a finding that the voluntary efforts ended
with the applicant making a "fair and reasonable offer" that was
rejected. n3
The MIPA statute tells us that an offer to pool "on the same yardstick basis" as the interest owners already included within the unit is
"fair and reasonable."4 4 Further guidance of "fair and reasonable"
has been provided by the courts, which have held that whether an
offer is fair and reasonable is to be considered from the standpoint of
38. §§ 102.004, 102.012.
39. § 102.014(a).
40. Id.
41. § 102.011.
42. Id.
43. § 102.013(b).
44. § 102.013(c).
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the offeree at the time the offer is made.45 The Texas Supreme Court
has also stated that a fair and reasonable offer must be "one which
takes into consideration those relevant facts, existing at the time of
the offer, which would be considered important by a reasonable person in entering into a voluntary agreement concerning oil and gas

properties. "46
The offer must even take into account reasonable risk penalties. In
the Barnett Shale, where the vast majority of wells produce with little
more than the simple risk that the well suffers mechanical problems, it
seems likely that the RRC will reject any offer that includes more
than a nominal risk penalty.47
Finally, MIPA itself dictates that an offer to pool is not fair and
reasonable if it gives the operator a preferential right to purchase mineral interests in the unit, an option to purchase production from the
unit, imposes operating charges other than reasonable overhead
charges, or precludes disputes over operation.4 8
Potential end result of application for forced pooling. If granted,
the RRC has several options for ordering the pooling and apportioning ownership of production, distribution of royalties, and responsibility for drilling and completion costs. In all cases, however, the
mandate is to reach a fair and reasonable result for all parties.4 9
For example, in ordering forced pooling, the RRC is permitted to
impose risk penalties on the unleased mineral owner to compensate
the risk takers for the fact that the force-pooled interests are not required to assume the risks of drilling the well. The risk penalty is statutorily limited to 100%,5" which means that the force-pooled interests
can be required to pay up to 200% of their pro rata share of the reasonable drilling and completion costs, plus their share of operating
expenses for the well before getting paid. Thus, in a forced-pooled
unit, an owner may elect to not pay his proportion share of drilling
and completion costs in advance. If that occurs, the RRC's forcedpooling order must provide for reimbursement out of production to
the parties advancing the costs, including all actual and reasonable
drilling, completion and operating costs, and a reasonable charge for
the risk. However, the standard for assessing a fair and reasonable
risk penalty is the actual chance of a successful completion at the time
the well is drilled. In the Barnett Shale, there is little risk, and in the
45. Windsor Gas Corp. v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 529 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1975, writ dism'd).
46. Carson v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 669 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex. 1984).
47. See Windsor Gas Corp., 529 S.W.2d at 836-37 (holding that an offer that included a risk-factor penalty of 2-1 not reasonable in light of testimony that there was
little risk for the proposed wells).
48. § 102.015.
49. Id.
50. See § 102.052(a).
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absence of evidence of risk, the RRC has concluded that nominaland even zero-risk penalties are appropriate. 1
The flip side: difficulties and disadvantagesin MIPA
Delay in obtaining decision. There are quite a few potential procedural delays in a MIPA proceeding. After waiting for the time necessary for reasonable offers to be formulated, distributed, and rejected,
the applicant must prepare the application and provide notice to all
interested parties. Then, the RRC schedules hearings, deliberates,
and formulates responses. All of this can take between one and two
years. To more accurately judge the delay factor, however, it must be
compared with the time and delay that can occur in negotiating leases
for large numbers of tiny tracts and then keeping track of all the individual leases.
Public disclosure of information. Historically, operators kept lease
payment terms secret so as to not impact other lease negotiations. In
such circumstances, operators can be loathe to undertake the MIPA
process, where it will have to prove the "fair and reasonableness" of
its pooling offer by showing in a public forum what has been paid in
the area. Recent times may have changed this attitude because in
most of the urban Fort Worth areas, lease terms were being publicized
at various public meetings and in news articles. Nevertheless, other
information will also need to be disclosed in a MIPA proceeding, including various well, geographic, and engineering information, and
such information will then be available not only to the unpooled mineral owner but to other offset operators who may be present at the
hearing.
Expense in preparing and arguing for the pooling. It seems unlikely that a small-tract owner would be able to prepare and prosecute
a MIPA application without the assistance of a lawyer and at least
some access to engineering and geological studies. Notably, however,
all of that is easily within the grasp of operators and large owners, who
will have access to the information required to prepare an application,
i.e. which acres are productive, which acres will be drained, etc. Such
an imbalance may increase the odds that small-tract owners will not
effectively defend against an operator's request to force pool. No one
can dispute that the MIPA proceeding incurs costs. However, to more
accurately judge the true costs of such a procedure, it needs to be
compared to the additional expenses of hiring landmen in long-term
efforts to completely lease large numbers of tracts; hiring engineers
51. See Tex. R.R. Comm'n, Application of PatriciaC. Nowak for Formation of a
Pooled Unit Pursuant to the Mineral Interest Pooling Act, Docket No. 06-0245016
(Oct. 17, 2005) (proposal for decision) (risk penalty of 10%); Tex. R.R. Comm'n, Application of Finley Resources, Inc., for the Formationof a Unit Pursuantto the Mineral
Interest Pooling Act, Docket No. 09-252373 (May 14, 2007) (proposal for decision)
(risk penalty of zero).
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and geologists to construct drillpipe paths that will simultaneously
comply with all spacing requirements, not trespass and maximize recovery; and the potential expenses of trespass claims or other legal
proceedings.
Despite these potential negatives, the recent MIPA application by
Finley Resources, Inc. demonstrates that MIPA can be used to fill in
the gaps of checkerboard holdings.

III.

ACTUAL USE OF

MIPA

BY OPERATOR

The reasonably recent application by Finley Resources, joined by
Chesapeake and Dale Resources, illustrates the concepts discussed in
this paper.
Background
" Prior to filing the MIPA application, Finley, Chesapeake, and Dale
spent about two years entering into nearly 350 small-tract leases
about a mile from downtown Fort Worth, which covered about 90
acres.
* Even after spending two years, during which time the amounts of
bonuses increased eight-fold and royalties increased from 18.75%
to 20%, Finley still lacked about 30 leases, which had an average
size of about 2/10ths of an acre.
" The efforts to obtain leases for all the land had included letters,
neighborhood meetings, and door to door canvassing.
* Finley's engineering showed that the "best path" for the drill bore
went through or very close to many of the unleased lots, which
raised the concern about unintentional trespass.
Finley Resources' Information Provided to RRC:
" Information on other wells in the area, including their production
rates;
* Stratigraphic cross-section information that showed formation
consistency around the proposed unit;
* Isopach map generated from available lots, scout tickets, and other
data;
* A structure map;
" Reasons to believe that all of the acreage in the proposed unit is
productive;
" Information to support the proposed drill paths;
* Information about the projected recovery if the proposed wells
were drilled (about 16 bcf).
RRC Found that the MIPA Requisites Were Met:
" Two or more tracts;
* In a common reservoir;
* Separately owned interests in the proposed unit;
" No agreement to pool;
* One of the owners of the right to drill (Finley) had proposed a drill
site;

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

13

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 16 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 11

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

* Finely had given proper mailed and published notice;
" That the pooling was required in order to permit those already in
the pool to produce their minerals, and that forcing the rest to pool
against their will would benefit them by preventing uncompensated drainage. This last finding, that essentially, "everybody
wins," was no doubt a powerfully persuasive argument to support
the forced-pooling ruling.
What the RRC Gave Finley and the Unleased Owners:
• Force pooled all the interests and gave Finley the right to drill;
" Precluded Finley from the surface use of any of the unleased owners (on grounds that those voluntarily in the pool had obtained the
same provision);
* Gave the unleased owners no bonus, 20% royalty interests, and a
4/5 working interest, out of which their share of expenses is to be
paid with zero risk penalty. Interestingly, if productive drilling
does result, the RRC's order may arguably be more lucrative for
those that were forced into the pool, than those that signed leases,
particularly those that signed early;
" Took 18 months to get there-close to the same time that Finley
spent trying to get the leases in the first place.
One must also wonder at the amount of money spent attempting to
obtain the leases versus how much was spent for the RRC proceeding.
Of course, as the RRC was coming out with that decision, the gas
market was crashing. To my knowledge, no well has been drilled.
In conclusion, when mineral owners-hearing of high bonuses and
royalty rates received in some location-get overly greedy and refuse
to reasonably negotiate or simply cannot be found, or when abandonment of leasing activities leaves operators with checker-board holdings, MIPA may be an old, but now useful, solution to a new problem.
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